Why Do We Assume GPS Will Always Be On? GPS does not appear in most enterprise risk registers. It is not in most business continuity plans. It has no assigned owner in most GRC frameworks. It is treated as background infrastructure (like electricity, like internet connectivity) assumed to be permanent and (fairly) reliable. March 2026 provided a reason to revisit that assumption. In the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz region, widespread GPS/GNSS interference caused AIS anomalies and false vessel positions at scale: credible maritime intelligence reporting put the figure at 1,100+ vessels in a 24-hour period at the outset of the conflict, with disruption persisting for weeks. GNSS is not a “navigation feature.” It is a shared dependency layer. When GNSS degrades, three things break at once: - Movement: ships, drones, aircraft, last-mile logistics. - Timing: GPS-derived time sync for telecoms, financial systems, and power-grid operations. - Trust: monitoring and safety systems that assume location/time data is correct. So a degraded GPS signal is not a maritime problem. It’s a business continuity problem. AI is compressing attacker timelines. Reconnaissance through exploitation now approaches real-time. Governance structures built for a slower threat environment are already behind. The Fault Line: the gap is not in the technology. It is in what we decided not to put on the risk register; and therefore never stress-tested, never assigned, never planned for. Map your stack. Own the risk. → TEKHORA is being built to map exactly this. Message me for early access. #FaultLines #CyberSecurity #OTSecurity #CyberPhysical #EnterpriseAI #TEKHORA Sources: Windward · Scientific American · BBC · Inside GNSS · France 24 · Microsoft · Booz Allen Hamilton